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Is The United States Losing
Its Dominance in High-
Technology Industries?
S. HE RECENT POLITICAL SEASON once
again focused attention on high-technology
industries and U.S. competitiveness. Many
politicians bemoan the loss of dominance in
high-technology industries by the United States.’
The statistics they use to support their argument
include the loss of U.S. global market share in
high-technology products, the declining U.S.
balance-of-payments surplus in high-technology
industries and the persistent balance-of-payments
deficit with Japan.
Others argue that the U.S. demise has been
greatly exaggerated. They point out that labor
productivity in the United States remains greater
than in other industrialized countries and that
the United States spent more than twice as
much in absolute terms as other countries on
research and development (R&D).
In fact, the evidence is mixed. Although the
United States no longer dominates high-technology
industries as it did in the 1950s and 1960s, much
of that is due to the economic growth of Japan
and Germany rather than to a decline in U.S.
high-technology industries. As per capita output
in these countries converges, one would also
expect indicators in high-technology industries to
also begin converging. Some indicators, however,
suggest that the United States places a relatively
smaller emphasis on R&D and education than do
Germany and Japan, the main U.S. competitors
in the high-tech arena.z As a result, few clear
conclusions can be drawn.
The goal of this article is to provide a careful,
albeit not comprehensive, analysis of U.S. high-
technology industries. First, the paper discusses
why high-technology industries are considered
valuable to an economy and presents evidence
to support these arguments. Next, several
performance indicators for high-technology
industries in the United States are examined.
When possible, these indicators are compared
with similar indicators in Japan and Germany.
The paper concludes with a discussion of what
these indicators predict for the future.
iThis attitude can be seen, for example, in the hearing
Factors Affecting U.S. Competitiveness (see U.S. Congress,
1992) and in articles such as “America’s High-Tech Decline,”
in Foreign Policy (see Ferguson, 1989).





The term high tech is often used, but rarely
defined. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) defines
high-technology industries as having the follow-
ing characteristics:
• the need for a strong R&D effort;
• strategic importance for governments;
• very rapid product and process obsoles-
cence;
• high-risk and large capital investments;
and
•ahigh degree of international cooperation
and competition in R&D production and
worldwide marketing.~
Unfortunately, although this definition is
important in isolating the general industries,
these characteristics are too general to be
used to classify firms for statistical purposes.
The OECD uses the ratio of R&D expenditure to
production costs (the R&D intensity) of an
industry, which is the defining characteristic of
high-technology for which data are available.~
According to this criterion, the top six R&D-
intensive industries in the main 11 countries are
aerospace, office machines and computers,
electronics and components, drugs, instruments
and electrical machinery.~These industries had
an average R&D intensity of lt.4 percent in
1980, compared with an average of approximately
4.0 percent for all manufacturing industries.
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The special concern expressed about high-
technology industries suggests that these industries
provide unique benefits absent from other manufac-
turing industries. These benefits result from the
relatively higher amount of innovation in these
industries and the subsequent effect on employ-
ment, wages, productivity and economic growth.
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As discussed in the preceding section, high-
technology industries are R&D intensive by
definition. Innovation, which takes an invention
and transforms it into a product or process that
a firm can sell or use, generally results from
R&D expenditures. Innovations can be broadly
divided into three types: process, final product
and intermediate product innovations. A process
innovation is one that improves the production
technique of a product—for example, Henry
Ford’s use of the moving assembly line to mass-
produce automobiles. This innovation dramatically
lowered the cost of producing automobiles
and significantly increased auto production.
An important distinguishing feature of process
innovation is that it directly increases the
productivity of one or more factors of production
(capital, labor, energy and materials).°In fact,
experts argue the following: process innovation
tends to “have a bigger effect on an industry’s
own rate of productivity increase than does
product R&D.”7
A final product innovation, in contrast, does
not increase productivity directly; instead, it
introduces a new product or a variation of an
existing product that individuals consume.
An example of a final product innovation is
the refrigerator, which replaced the icebox.
Final product innovations generally have a
positive effect on the quality of life—for example,
refrigerators involve much less maintenance
than iceboxes, leaving more free time for other
activities—and have a stimulative effect onoutput.
~OECD (1986). In this paper we consider only high-technology
manufacturing industries. Other sectors, such as banking
services and insurance, could be considered high tech.
4Many variations of this definition are used, in part because
some prefer to define high technology in terms of product
classes, whereas others (including the OECD) define them
in terms of industry classes. Because of data limitations,
this paper uses the OECD classification unless stated
otherwise.
5The main 11 countries, as classified by the OECD, are the
United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Italy, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium.
The industry classifications differ somewhat from those used
by the National Science Board (1991), which classifies the
following as high-technology industries: industrial chemicals;
drugs and medicines; engines and turbines; office and
computing machinery; communication equipment; aerospace;
and scientific instruments. This difference is likely due to the
fact that the OECD measure is an average over 11 countries
in 1980. If a seventh industry were included by the OECD, it
would be the automobile industry. The industries classified
as high technology according to the OECD classifications
have not changed during the course of the sample.
°Mansfieldproposes using total factor productivity, which is
the most general measure of productivity. For a discussion
of this measure, see Mansfield (1990).
7See Mansfield (1988). Rosenberg (1982) also stresses the
importance of improvements to an initial innovation.21
Final product innovations, however, do not
increase factor productivity directly.”
An intermediate product innovation results in
a new product that is used to produce another
good. In other words, the new product is not
consumed by individuals, but rather is used by
firms. Productivity increases in industries that
use intermediate product innovation. For example,
a new machine tool that significantly reduces
the time it takes to produce furniture would be
considered an intermediate product innovation.
Output increases both because the tool industry
has a new product and because productivity
increases in the furniture industry. Other
industries may also benefit if they can adapt the
innovation for their own use or if the innovation
leads to other innovations. For example, a wood
lathe might suggest the possibility of a metal
lathe. Innovations that enable a country to
produce more output with the same amount of
input increase productivity and therefore
aggregate output.
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Economists have long believed that innovation
has a positive effect on economic growth.
Schumpeter (1950) argued that the process of
creative destruction (the creation of new products
that replaced existing products) drives economic
growth. Others, such as Solow (1957), estimated
the effects of technological change on economic
growth. Recently, new groivth theorists, such as
Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991), have explored the
determinants of technological change and its effects
on economic growth. They identify endogenous
technological spillovers as the primary deter-
minant of economic growth.”
Productivity gt-owth is a primary determinant
of a country’s standard of living. As labor
becomes more productive, wages rise.’°Some
economists have argued that technological
innovation has a negative effect on employment.
The United States, however, has had continued
improvements in productivity over the last 100
years, whereas its average unemployment rate
has remained essentially unchanged. This
suggests that if productivity increases have a
negative effect on employment, the effect is
not permanent.
Firms invest in R&D because they hope to
earn an above-average rate of return on any
innovation. The amount of innovation (if any)
that results from R&D is always uncertain, so
there is no guarantee of a return. As a result,
firms expect a greater-than-average rate of return
to compensate them for the risk associated with
R&D. This return is the cash flow earned over
time from an innovation, which includes revenue
from product sales, as well as earnings from the
leasing or sale of the new technology. The greater
the expected return, the greater the incentive to
invest in R&D.
The benefits to society from innovation,
however, can be substantially larger than the
return earned by the innovating firm. The social
rate of return measures this benefit. The social
rate of return equals the private rate of return
plus any technological spillovers, that is, any
benefits from an innovation that are not appro-
priated by the innovator.h1 Because the social
rate of return usually exceeds the rate of return
the innovator earns, there tends to be a less-
than-optimal level of investment in R&D and new
technologies.12 As a result, most countries enact
policies that encourage innovation. The most
common way is through patent and copyright
protection, which improve the likelihood that
the innovator will earn an above-normal return
on an innovation.”
“Because the measurement techniques currently used do not
measure changes in quality or nonmarket activities (such as
household work), output may or may not increase as a
result of the innovation. For a discussion of the problems in
growth accounting and measuring the value of innovation,
see Griliches (1979) or Grossman and Helpman (1991).
“In this context, endogenous technical spillovers refer to the
gains in knowledge associated with the process of innovation.
For a more comprehensive discussion, see the sources
cited in the text.
‘°Situationsexist that could make some workers worse off,
however. An innovation that substitutes capital for labor may
reduceemployment in the industry adopting theinnovation. Al-
though displaced workers may be worse off in the short run,
the lower prices that result from an increase in productivity
could increase consumers’ purchasing power and increase
demand in other industries. As a result, employment could
rise in those other industries, leaving aggregate employment
unchanged. Of course, there are likely adjustment costs
associated with the shift in employment. For a discussion
of this issue, see Baumol and McLennan (1985).
11For a discussion of alternative measures of spillovers, see
Griliches (1979).
“’The possibility of a significant difference between the social
and private rate of return exists because it is impossible to
control the flow of information generated by an innovation.
See Arrow (1962) for a careful discussion of this problem.
135ee Butler (1990) for a discussion of the relationship between
property rights and innovation.22
Governments often provide other incentives,
both explicit and implicit, to innovate. Tax cred-
its, for example, are offered for R&D in many
industrial countries.”’ Many governments also
provide funds for R&D, both directly and
indirectly, by subsidizing education. In fact, the
United States, though it has no explicit industrial
policy, publicly finances nearly half of all R&D in
the country (an estimated 43.5 percent in 1991).
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The benefits of an innovation, particularly its
indirect benefits, are not restricted geographically.
To the extent that knowledge generated from
innovation is internationally available, countries
benefit from all innovation, regardless of where
it originates. In general, the gains from innovation
are greater in the innovating country than in
countries that import the technology because of
the increased jobs and higher wages associated
with high-technology industries. In addition, the
innovating country benefits from earnings on
the sale or lease of new technology to other
countries. The extent to which a nation benefits
from domestic innovation depends greatly on the
degree to which that nation is compensated for
the innovation-related knowledge and technologies
that flow abroad.
Technological innovation, particularly process
innovation, has historically traveled slowly because
of international capital and labor immobility, as well
as linguistic and cultural differences. Mansfield
(1984) discusses another reason why process
innovation disseminates slowly across borders:
Firms are often unwilling to license new tech-
nology abroad because it is difficult to control
the diffusion of the technology in other countries.
This licensing argument should not apply within
firms, however. The recent growth of multinational
corporations, such as IBM and Toyota, in high-
technology industries has significantly increased
the pace of technological diffusion internationally.
Regardless of whether impediments to the
flow of information or technology exist, how-
ever, an innovating country still benefits from
innovation through both the private and social
returns generated. If process improvements to
an initial innovation are made in the innovating
country, the benefits of the initial innovation
are evengreater over timefor that country because
of increases in productivity.
Evidence .11c~gording
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A 1960 National Bureau of Economic Research
conference was specifically designed to examine
inventive activity, the activity that generates in-
novation. One of the conference papers discussed
the chemical, allied products and pharmaceutical
industries between 1947 and 1957 and found that
“productivity increases are associated with invest-
ment in the improvement of technology and the
greater the expenditures for research and
development the greater the rate of growth of
productivity.” 15 Morerecent studies alsofound R&D
to be an important determinant of innovation and
productivity and therefore economic growth.”
In addition, researchers have found significant
differences between the social and private rates
of return earned on innovations, supporting the
view that the benefits to society from innovation
are greater than those appropriated by firms.”’
Unfortunately, these results must be viewed
with some skepticism because of measurement
and data problems.”’
Another way high-tech industries benefit a
country directly is through their effect on wages
and employment. In general, wages might be
expected to be higher in innovating industries
because producing and developing new products
or implementing new processes initially requires
a higher skill level. Existing wage and employment
data in U.S. high-technology industries support
this theory. In 1972, wages in high-technology
industries were 16.7 percent higher than wages
in all other manufacturing industries. By 1989,
wages in high-technology industries were 24.7
percent higher.”’
U.S. compounded annual employment growth
“’Some empirical evidence of the effect of tax credits for
R&D suggests that their importance in the United States
may be modest. See Mansfield (1986) and Cordes (1989).
A recent study by Hall (1992) finds stronger support for the
effectiveness of R&D tax credits.
“’See Minasian (1962, p. 94). Recall that increasing the rate
of productivity increases economic growth. Output may not
necessarily increase if the result of an innovation is a
substantial increase in leisure relative to hours worked.
“’See, for example, Leonard (1971), Mansfield (1980) and
Scherer (1982).
irSee, for example, Mansfield (1981) and Bernstein and
Nadiri (1988, 1989).
isSee Griliches (1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
for a discussion of these problems.
“’This rise in wages could be due to an increase in the
demand for skilled labor that exceeds the supply. See Katz
and Murphy (1991).23
rates between 1970 and 1989 were among the
highest in the pharmaceuticals (3.3 percent) and
aircraft (3.2percent) sectors. Employment declined
in most lower-technology U.S. industries; the
largest declines were in ferrous metals (-2.4
percent) and other transport equipment (-2.5
percent).’°On average, the compounded annual
employment growth rate for all manufacturing
industries was 0.2 percent during this period.
Wage differences in high- and low-technology
industries can be seen in many industrialized
countries. In 1988, wages in high-technology
industries for the Group of Seven countries
were on average 26.5 percent higher than
wages in low-technology industries.”
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Both the theoretical and empirical evidence of
the benefits associated with innovation suggest
that R&D-intensive industries are particularly
valuable to a country. U.S. high-technology
industries dominated the world market for most
of the postwar period. In the last two decades,
however, this dominance appears to have
deteriorated, as reflected by the declining U.S.
share of high-technology manufacturing output in
the flEW since 1970. This section looks at several
indicators of current and future performance in
high-technology industries for the United States.”’
The next section compares some of these
indicators with those of Japan and Gem-many.
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Table I shows various statistics on U.S. R&D.
High-technology manufacturing output increased
by more than 50 percent in 10 years—from 20.0
percent of total manufacturing output in 1980
to 30.4 percent by 1990.”” This marked increase
occurred at the expense of other manufacturing
industries. Manufacturing output as a percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) remained fairly
constant over this period.
Statistics on gross expenditures on R&D
(GERD) and business expenditures on R&D
(nERD), which are available over a longer
period, provide mixed evidence on the behavior
of U.S. R&D. Figure 1 shows the components of
GERD for 1991, with BERD clearly being the
largest component. BERD is divided to show the
percent of business R&D that is government
funded. Both GERD and BERD have risen in real
(constant-dollar) terms since 1975. As a percent
of GDP, however, both GERD and BERD have
fluctuated since 1970, falling until 1978, rising
from 1978 to 1985 and declining since then.”4
Many of the fluctuations have been in defense-
related expenditures on R&D. Nondefense
spending on R&D as a percent of gross national
product (GNP) increased slightly, from 1.6
percent in 1972 to 1.9 percent in 1989.
An important caveat to these numbers results
from the problems associated with using an
aggregate deflator (such as the GDP deflator) for
R&D expenditure. One study found that because
of the inadequacies in the deflator used, real
R&D expenditures in the period 1969—79 rose
only 1 percent—not the 7 percent reported
using a standard deflator.’5 In fact, most evidence
suggests that R&D costs increase more rapidly
than the R&D deflator.””
Another indicator ofR&D activity can be obtained
by examining its components—basic research,
applied research and development. According to
the National Science Foundation, basic research is
“research that advances scientific knowledge but
does not have specific commercial objectives.”’
“°Thecompounded annual growth rate for the aircraft and
other transport equipment industry was calculated for the
period 1972—89. The other transport equipment category is
transport equipment less shipbuilding, automotive and aircraft.
“1The Group of Seven countries are Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.
Because of data limitations, this wage comparison uses a
broader definition of high technology.
“’Some analysts use patent statistics as an indicator of
inventive activity. According to Cockburn and Griliches
(1988), however, “Data on R&D expenditures. - are stronger
measures of input to the process by which firms produce
technical innovation than patents are of its ‘output.’ “ In
addition, cross-country comparisons of patent statistics are
often invalid because ofvarying standards across countries.
Thus patent statistics can be used to compare changes
within a country over time, but not across countries.
““Table 1 uses the National Science Board definition of high
technology.
“To get a sense of the magnitudes being examined, a 0.1
percent change in GDP in 1990 equals $5.5 billion.
““See Mansfield (1984).
““See Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989). Unfortunately, no
standard series on an R&D deflator for the United States is
available. Available estimates are not consistent with the
series shown above. These series were used because they
are internationally comparable.
“See National Science Board (1991).Table 1
High-Technology Indicators for the United States
Hi-tech
manufactures Manufacturing
GERO BERD as a percent of total as a percent
(billions of GERD as a (billions of BERD as a manufacturing of GOP in
Year 1982 dollars) percent of GDP 1982 dollars) percent of GDP output 1982 dollars’
1970 65.27 2.72 43.02 1.79 NA 2112
1975 61.93 232 ‘1079 153 NA. 2054
1980 74.90 7.39 5193 1 66 20.0 21 52
1981 78.38 245 5512 172 20.7 21.25
1982 81 69 2.62 58.65 1 88 224 20.37
1983 8751 271 62.82 1.95 229 20.87
1984 95.86 2.78 69.45 201 24.5 21.76
1985 10462 2.93 75.96 2.13 255 2175
1986 106.85 2.91 7678 2.09 270 21.78
1987 108.62 2.87 7843 207 21.9 2274
1988 112.28 2.83 80.63 2.04 287 2325
1989 114.66 2.82 8044 1.98 29.6 2273
1990 11465 2.80 79.24 1.93 30.4 N.A
1991 NA. 2.82 NA. 1.95 NA. NA.
DEFINITIONS:
GERD——Gross expenditure on research and development
BERD---Bus’ness expenditure on research and development
GOP—Gross domestic product
‘Two differenl deflators were used for this calculation.
SOURCE: OE~D.Science and Technology Statistics (1992) Nalional Science Board: Economic Report of the President.
Applied research is the application of new scien- This argument is particularly relevant concerning
tific knowledge to determine how a specific new and improved production processes, which
problem or need can be met. For industry this have a more direct effect on productivity. For
includes specific commercial objectives. Development, example, the President’s Commission on Industrial
on the other hand, is the “systematic use of the Competitiveness states the following: “It does [the
knowledge or understanding gained from United States] little good to design state-of-the-
research directed toward the production of art products, if within a short time our foreign
useful materials [and] devices -- -including design competitors can manufacture them more cheaply.”’
and development of prototypes and processes.”’ According to Mansfield (1988), despite these
Thus research is necessary for invention, but criticisms there is nothing to “indicate that
development is required to bring an invention there was any perceptible increase between
to market. That is, development is required for’ 1976 and 1985 in the proportion of [U.S. firms’]
innovation. Between 1960 and 1.990, the allocation R&D expenditures devoted to new or improved
of R&D expenditures within these categories processes.”
remained essentially unchanged.
Overall, these statistics appear to contradict
Some commentators have expressed concern the idea that R&D expenditures by U.S. high-
about the lack of relative increase in development technology industries declined in the 1980s.
expenditures. They believethat such expenditures Since 1985, however, R&D as a percent of GIJP
are critical for future technological progress. has been declining. This relative decline may be
““See National Science Board (1991).
““Cited in Mansfield (1988).Figure 1










a cause for concern, for both productivity
growth and performance in high-technology
industries.~0
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Much of the concern about U.S. high-technology
performance has focused on U.S. indicators
relative to those of other countries. This section
compares U.S. high-technology performance
with that of Japan and Germany.”1 Because of
the sheer size of the United States, its total
R&D expenditures are much greater than those
of Germany or Japan. For example, using OECD
purchasing-power parities to convert to dollars,
(hERD in 1990 was $66 billion in Japan, $28
billion in Germany and $151. billion in the
United States.”’
As a result, the United States can benefit from
the additional resources it can spend on R&D,
to the extent that its R&D is at least as productive
as R&D in the other two countries. Several
researchers have expressed concern regarding
the productivity of U -S. R&D, particularly in
regard to other countries.”” One reason for this
is the high percentage of R&D funded by the
government. Studies have found that government-
funded private R&D is less productive than
privately funded business R&D.”4
Figures 2 and 3 show GERD and BERD as a
percent of GDP for the three countries. Through-
out most of the last 20 years, the United States
has had higher GERD/GDP and BERD/GDP ratios
than Germany and Japan.”5 From 1964 to 1990,
Japan and Germany each increased its GERD as
a percent of GDP by approximately 100 percent.
From 1980 to 1990 (1981 for Germany), however,
“°Theeffects of R&D are estimated to have about a two-year
lag on productivity. A longer lag is associated with basic
research (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1989).
“‘In 1989, the average expenditure on GERD as a percent of
GDP for these three countries was 2.9 percent, compared
with the OECD average for reporting countries, which was
1.7 percent. This statistic excludes Australia, Belgium and
Portugal. If they were included, the number would likely be
slightly lower.
““Purchasing-power parities measure the number of U.S.
dollars required in each country to buy the same represen-
tative basket of final goods and services that cost $100 in
the United States.
““See Scherer (1982) and Mansfield (1988). Mohnen, Nadiri
and Prucha (1986) compared the rate of return on R&D in
the three countries and also found that the return was
lowest in the United States.
““Because of the problems associated with using standard
deflators for R&D, these numbers could be somewhat
misleading. If, for example, R&D costs rose faster in Japan
relative to GOP than in the other two countries, the actual
ratio for Japan would be relatively lower. The only attempt
to calculate R&D deflators across countries was done by
the OECD (1979) for the period 1967—75. The results
suggested that the R&D deflator moved together for these
countries. Unfortunately, the deflators for Japan and
Germany were not directly comparable, and a deflator
was not calculated for the United States. As a result, it is
difficult to predict whether the price of R&D would move
differently across countries. A worldwide program has
attempted to produce international comparisons of variables
in the National Income and Product Accounts across
countries. See Kravis and Lipsey (1990) for a summary and
update on this program.
BERD
“4See Griliches (1986, 1987).26~
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U.S. data for 1971 and German data for 1980 were not available.
Figure 3
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German data for1976,1978, and 1980 were not available.27
Figure 4










1965 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
The figure for Germany increased in 1979 because the 1979 survey
includes small and medium enterprises not surveyed in 1977.
III
85 1987
Data for Germany in 1978,1980,1982,1984,1986, and 1987 are estimated.
SOURCE: National Science Board, 1991.
Japan’s increase in GERD as a percent of GDP
was 40.8 percent, much higher than the 15.6
percent increase in Germany or the 17.2 percent
increase in the United States. BERD as a percent
of GDp also increased steadily in Japan and
Germany over the last 23 years, whereas U.S.
spending fluctuated during the same period. By
1990 the ratios were essentially equal in the
three countries.
‘Ihe lack of variability in other countries
could be attributed to the low level of military
spending in these other countries. For example,
in 1989, 28.9 percent of U.S. R&D was defense
related, compared with 4.6 percent of Germany’s
R&D and less than 1.0 percent of Japan’s R&D.
Another nieasure of innovative activity is the
number of science and engineering (S&E)
personnel relative to the total workforce (see
figure 4). Throughout tile sample, the United
States has employed more S&E personnel per
10,000 workers than either Germany or Japan.
Although the number of S&E workers relative to
the labor force has risen on average in all three
countries, the increase has been substantially
greater in Japan and Germany. As a result, this
difference among the three countries has
narrowed considerably.
The technological balance of payments (shown
in table 2) measures the difference between
receipts and payments related to earnings on
technology and is an indicator of the degree to
which a country is an exporter or importer of
technology. This measure includes revenues
associated with the use of patents, licenses,
trademarks, designs, inventions, know-how arid
closely related technical services. This balance
has been steadily increasing for the United States
since 1969 (the first year data are available),
showing that earnings on U.S. technological








The increased importance of high-technology
industries in these countries can also be seen
by looking at international comparisons in high-
technology indicators (see table 2)56 High-
technology manufactures as a percent of total
domestic manufacturing output rose by more
than 100 percent in Japan between 1980 and
1990. This ratio increased in the United States
and Germany, although by significantly less—
52.0 percent and 26.1 percent, respectively.
global high-technology manufacturing declined
by 11.1 percent. Germany’s share declined 20.3
percent during this period as well, and the
share of the remaining OECD countries as a
whole declined 13.6 percent (see table 3). As
these countries lost market share, Japan’s
market share increased 58.7 percent. Thus
although the United States remains the major
producer of high-technology goods, it no longer
dominates all high-technology industries.
The composition of high-technology goods
production also changed markedly during these
10 years. For example, the U.S. share of global
production of office and computing machinery
fell by 15.2 percentage points, whereas Japan’s
share rose an offsetting 15.5 percentage points.
Similarly, the U.S. share of radio, television and
communications equipment declined 6.0 percentage
points from 1980 to 1990, whereas Japan’s share
of this global market increased by 15.6 percentage
points. This suggests that the United States has
faced increased competition in these industries.
On the other hand, its position in industrial
chemicals, drugs and medicines remains
essentially unchanged, and its market share of
scientific instruments increased somewhat.
““The rest of this section uses the National Science Board
definition of high-technology industries. Because the board
changed from the OECD definition in its 1991 report, a
longer consistent time series for these variables is not
available.
Table 2
International comparisons in High-Technology Indicators
High-tech manufactures share of total Technology balance of payments2
manufacturing outputl (percent) (billions of U.S. dollars)
Japan Germany U.S. Japan Germany
1971 N.A NA. N A. 2.30 —0.44 —0.32
1975 NA. NA. NA. 3.83 —0.37 —0.45
1980 200 16.3 16.1 636 0.32 —056
1985 255 24.6 204 5.10 —0.27 —0.65
1986 27.0 26.2 20.8 6.19 —017 --0.55
1987 279 29.5 20.9 770 -0.32 —0.60
1988 28.7 32.9 21 3 8.80 —0.32 —0.65
1989 29.6 345 20.6 9.57 0.00 -1.05
1990 304 35.1 203 12.65 -0.17 —0.93
‘National Science Board definition
“OECD purchasing-power parties are used to convert yen and deutsche marks to dollars.
SOURCE: National Science Board. Science and Engineerinq Indicators f 1991); OEc~D,Science and Technology Statistics.
payments for technological information. Japan
and Germany have both, on average, increased
their exports of technology during this period.
By 1989 Japan exported as much technology as
it imported, suggesting that, contrary to popular
perception, Japan is becoming an innovator in
its own right.
In the last 10 years, the market for high-
technology products in OECD countries has
increased by 117 percent in constant (1980)
dollars. Output in high-technology industries
rose in Japan, Germany arid the United States
during this period. However, despite the 92.9
percent increase in the value of its high-technology
output from 1980 to 1990, the U.S. share ofTable 3
country Share of Global Market for High-Tech Manufactures, by Industry:
1980—90 (in percent)
1988 1969 1990
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 (est.) (est.) (est.)
High-tech manufactures
United States 40.4 39.5 38.9 378 379 36.3 369 375 37.0 36.0 359
Japan 184 19.7 20.4 21.6 23.3 23.6 23.4 25.1 265 28.4 29.2
Germany 11.8 11.7 118 118 113 120 11.5 10.5 10.1 95 9.4
Industrial chemicals
United States 32.7 33.1 29.8 29.2 28.0 258 28.5 31 4 31.2 32.2 32.5
Japan 16.1 144 15.3 14.0 14.1 13.4 12.1 13.1 12.7 13.4 14.1
Germany 16.2 169 17.9 19.1 19.5 204 20.4 18.5 18.7 18.8 18.4
Drugs and medicines
Unitod States 29.6 29.6 30.3 30 3 30 4 30 0 30 4 31.4 31.4 30.8 29.2
Japan 21.2 21.7 22.1 22.0 21 2 207 204 19.9 201 20.1 20.3
Germany 131 13 I 12.5 125 12.7 12.3 12.1 11.4 115 114 10.9
Engines and turbines
United States 44.2 37.9 35 0 33 0 35 4 34 8 35.4 35.4 35.8 35 2 34 9
Japan 184 161 17.9 18.8 180 170 149 157 15.5 15.8 153
Germany 11.3 9.9 90 94 103 112 10.9 11.2 10.7 108 11.6
Office and computing machinery
United States 50.0 490 49.1 45.2 44.0 39.6 37.8 38.1 37.3 356 34.8
Japan 22.0 23.0 24.0 27.2 27.5 302 30.8 31.8 33.3 34.6 37.5
Germany 65 74 70 7.0 7.4 8.3 8.0 71 66 5.5 5.4
Radio, TV and communication
equipment
United States 36.6 34.8 350 340 338 329 328 323 31.5 299 306
Japan 26.4 30.5 307 32.2 35.5 34.0 330 365 393 42.9 42.0
Germany 12.0 114 114 111 98 113 11.6 103 96 95 10.0
Aircraft
United States 5/6 56.4 566 55.8 58.7 57.9 59.5 58.7 59.2 56.4 55.9
Japan 22 2.4 2.3 2.4 25 2.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6 36
Germany 48 53 60 5.4 5.0 5.0 44 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.8
Scientific instruments
United Stales 49.1 49.0 505 500 504 484 484 50.8 51.5 527 534
Japan 176 19.? 18.1 19.0 19.0 197 189 18 I 162 16.1 154
Germany 11.4 10.8 102 98 9.8 10.8 11.1 11.1 114 lOB 11.1
NOTES Totai sh:pments by OECD countries are used as a proxy for global output. Shares represent each countrys
shipments as a percentage of OECD sh;pments. Germany refers to the former Feooral Republic of
Germany
SOUflCE See Nationai SciencG Board (1991)30
Figure 5
International Comparisons in Education
Average mathematics test scores for eighth-grade students, 1981 -1982
Students in Japan and Hong Kong were attending the seventh grade.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education.
Whether the United States will continue to be
a world leader in high-technology manufacturing
is unclear. Although its relative position in high-
tech manufacturing has slipped in the past
decade, so have those of many other industrialized
countries, with Japan gaining most of the lost
market share.”~On average, the U.S. declinewas less
than those of European countries. Furthermore, it
seems unlikely that any country could maintain
the degree of dominance that the United States
enjoyed in the early postwar period. Even if the
United States had continued to increase its high-
tech manufacturing at the same rate as in the
postwar period, the entry of other countries
into high-technology industries would have
guaranteed a loss of market share for the
United States. Hence the m~ecen1loss of world
market share itself is not cause for alarm, given
the significant output increase in US high.tech
industries during the period.
%/ilyVF IS s.i.s:u~i TI.::; 50.01 r[rqr~
Concern remains that hidden in these trends is
the future decline of U.S. high-technology industries.
Given the higher skills necessary for both
employment in high-technology industries and
success in R&D, the education level and scholastic
performance of U.S. students (relative to those in
other countries) is coming under increased scrutiny
A possible indicator of future performance in high-
technology industries, educational performance
comparisons, is presented in figures 5 and 6.
International education comparisons are extremely
difficult because of the differences in educational
systems. As a result, these statistics should be
viewed only as suggestive.””
An international assessment study comparing
students from 18 countries found significant
“7The United Kingdom substantially increased its share of
several high-technology industries and its share overall.
Data were not presented for the United Kingdom, however,
because the R&D series is incomplete and its R&D
expenditure as a percent of GNP is significantly lower than
for the countries presented (2.0 in 1989).
““For the complete comparisons, see original source.
Test Average Arithmetic Algebra Geometry Measurement Statistics
The overall test average is a weighted average.
• Japan
o UnitedStates
o Other CountriesFigure 6
International Comparison in Education












Tests were administered between 1983 and 1986. The average age in years and
months is 10:9 for fifth-grade students and 14:10 for ninth-grade students.
SOURCE: International Association forthe Evaluation of Educational Achievement.
differences in the performances of U.S. and
Japanese students (Germany did not participate).””
In fact, the U.S. ranking in geometry was eleventh,
and its ranking in measurement was twelfth out
of the 12 industrialized countries that participated
in the tests. In a different study of science test
scores for 10- and 14-year-olds, the U.S. students
ranked significantly lower than Japanese students.~°
On average, U.S. students generally did poorer
than students from other countries.~’
Several other studies that focus only on U.S.
students have found a general decline in their
performance in mathematics and science during
the 1970s with some improvement in the 1980s.4”
These statistics suggest that the United States
may have difficulty meeting the demand for the
jobs associated with high-technology industries
because these jobs require an increasingly high
level of skill.
‘Table 4 shows the percentage of higher
education degrees awarded to U.S. citizens and
permanent U.S. residents that were awarded in
science and engineering. The percentage of
master’s degrees and doctorates in science and
““The participating countries were Belgium, Canada, England
and Wales, Finland, France, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Scotland, Swaziland, Sweden. Thailand and the United States.
40
The participating countries were Austrailia, Canada (English),
England, Finland, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Singapore,
Sweden, Thailand and the United States.
“
1
Unfortunately, only a small amount of research has
occurred in this area, For a discussion of several other
comparative studies, which reached similar conclusions,
see National Science Board (1991), OECD (1992) and the
November 21, 1992, issue of The Economist.
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See, for example, National Science Board (1991, 1989).
• Japan
o United States
o Other CountriesTable 4
Degrees Awarded to U.S. Citizens and U.S. Permanent Residents in the
United States for Selected Years
1971 1979 1981 1985 1987 1989 1990
Baccalaureate degrees in science and
engineering as a percent of total 40 1 398 39.1 355 35.1 33.7 33.6
Science and engineering baccalaureate
degrees awarded per 100.000 population 166.2 161 5 157.0 142.5 140.2 136.1 138.3
Total baccalaureate degrees awarded 912.484 913.487 924.246 961.619 974.940 1,003,714 1,035.598
Masters degrees in science and
engineering as a percent of total 25.0 25.0 253 25.9 266 25 B 25.1
Per capita science and engineering
masters degrees awarded per 100.000
population 34.1 31 4 30.2 28.2 28.6 28.9 28.9
Total masters degrees awarded 300.896 282.648 274.740 260,261 262.268 278,927 290.345
Doctorate degrees in science and
engineering as a percent ot total 532 54.0 54.8 56.2 56.6 577 57.2
Per capital science and engineerinq
doctorate degrees awarded per 100.000
population 6.6 6.4 63 58 5.7 5.8 5.9
Total doctorate degrees awarded 27.487 26.784 26,342 24.694 24.561 25,024 25,844
SOURCE. National Science Foundation.
engineering being awarded has increased since t iiitds coLlicI cause the U.S. share of global
1977. On a per capita basis, however, the number output in high technology to continue its
of people getting bachelor’s and advanced degrees, decline. Of course, firms or the government
both in science and engineering and overall, has could replace all of the military-funded R&D
generally declined, although some improvement with other R&D funding.”” A significant decline
has occurred in the last three years. in R&D expenditure, however, would likely re-
duce U.S. innovation both absolutely and relative
Another factor that could play a pivotal role in to other countries and could have an adverse
determining the future of R&D investment in effect on U.S. high-technology industries.
the United States is the recently proposed cuts Legislation has already been proposed in
in military spending. As previously discussed, Congress to ensure government’s commitment to
defense-related expenditures on R&D in 1987 R&D; one proposal uses defense-funded
were responsible for 65.5 percent of government- scientists to develop commercial technologies.~”
funded R&D and 28.9 percent of total R&D in At this point, determining either the magnitude
the United States, which is a significantly larger of any R&D cuts or the response of the
portion than allocated in other countries. nondefense government and private sectors to
Analysts are concerned that a loss of these these cuts is essentially impossible.
““For a study that examined the effect of a cut in federally
financed R&D in the energy sector, see Mansfield (1984).
445ee, for example, the National Defense Authorization Act
(1992).High-technology industries have a significant
positive effect on economic growth because of
their high rates of innovation. During the 1980s,
production of high’technology products in OECD
countries increased by 117 percent. The
continued increase in resources devoted to R&D
in Germany, Japan and the United States reflects
the importance of high-technology industries.
Although high-technology output as a percent of
GDP has decreased somewhat in the United
States during the last few years, it remains
higher than it was in 1970. During this period,
Japan and Germany, which initially spent a much
smaller portion of GDP on R&D than did the
United States, had significant growth in R&D
expenditures and high-technology output. Thus
although the commitment of resources for R&D
relative to the size of each economy has
essentially equalized in the three countries, the
United States still spends the most in absolute
terms on R&D and has the largest market share
it) high-technology industries. The extent to which
the United States can exploit its size advantage
depends on how productive U.S. R&D is relative
to these other countries. Unfortunately, little
research has been conducted on this topic, so
although some experts have expressed concern
about the productivity of U.S. R&D, evidence
remains inconclusive. This important area of
research has yet to be fully explored. Neverthe-
less, the increasing importance of high-technology
industries suggests that a continued presence in
these industries will help maintain high-wage!
high.skill jobs and continued economic growth
for the United States.
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